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Abstract 
Between 1993 and April 1999 there was no minimum wage in the UK (except in agriculture).  
In this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a National Minimum Wage (NMW) 
in April 1999 on one heavily affected sector, the residential care homes industry.  This sector 
contains a large number of low paid workers and as such can be viewed as being very 
vulnerable to minimum wage legislation. We look at the impact on both wages and 
employment.  Our results suggest that the minimum wage raised the wages of a large number 
of care homes workers, causing a very big wage compression of the lower end of the wage 
distribution, thereby strongly reducing wage inequality. There is some evidence of 
employment and hours reductions after the minimum wage introduction, though the estimated 
effects are not that sizable given how heavily the wage structure was affected. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The debate on the economic effects of minimum wages remains a controversial and heavily 
researched question. In fact there currently appears to be something of a methodological 
divide amongst economists about what minimum wages actually do to economic outcomes. 
Some researchers choose to stick to what used to be the orthodoxy, at least since Brown, 
Gilroy and Kohen’s (1982) influential survey of the evidence available up to the late 1970s, 
that minimum wages are bad for employment, especially teenage employment. Others have 
been more swayed by the recent ‘before and after’ micro work (Card, 1992, Card and 
Krueger, 1994, 1995) which finds it hard to identify any employment effect at all and moves 
the question on from ‘how negative is the minimum wage employment effect?’ to ‘is there 
any impact on employment at all?’ The vast majority of work used to inform this debate is 
based upon US data (Brown, 1999). Some fresh evidence, from a different context, probably 
needs to be cast on these questions.1 We attempt to offer some evidence of this sort in this 
paper, where we have a unique design setting induced by the introduction of a minimum 
wage to a labour market previously unregulated by minimum wage legislation. 
In April 1999 a National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced to the UK labour 
market. This is the first time that the UK has had an economy wide minimum wage. 
Furthermore, because the old industry-based Wages Council system that used to regulate pay 
in some sectors was abolished in 1993, the NMW was introduced into a labour market with 
no minimum wage legislation in operation.2  Given these circumstances one can think of the 
introduction of the UK NMW as providing a very good testing ground for evaluating the 
economic effects of minimum wages. In fact one can plausibly argue that it provides a better 
testing ground than much of the ‘before and after’ US work on minimum wage effects (see 
                                                          
1 Indeed, one of Hamermesh’s (2002) prime examples of where international empirical work in labour 
economics is required to inform the US debate is the research area on minimum wages. 
2  Except in agriculture. The Agricultural Wages Board was not abolished along with the other Wages Councils. 
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the discussion in Card and Krueger, 1995) as they are all based upon minimum wage 
increases where a minimum wage floor was already in place.  
In this paper we look at what happened when the UK minimum wage was introduced 
in a low wage sector one can view as being particularly vulnerable to minimum wages, the 
UK residential care homes industry. Our analysis is based upon a large-scale survey that we 
carried out before and after the introduction of the NMW.  The survey focused upon the 
whole population of residential care homes in Britain, collecting information on all workers 
in the homes, and on an array of home characteristics.   
We chose to look at this sector for several reasons.  First, it contains many low-wage 
workers, so the minimum wage has real potential to have a noticeable impact on outcomes.3 
Second, we chose this sector because it is not unionised.  Thirdly, it consists of large numbers 
of small firms (average employment being somewhere in the range of 15-20 workers) doing a 
very homogeneous activity in geographically concentrated markets. The small size of these 
firms means that monitoring problems are unlikely to be severe because the owner normally 
also works in the home and also that collection of good quality data on all workers is feasible. 
Finally, the product market side of this sector is interesting. An important fraction of the 
residents of these homes have their care paid for by the Department for Social Security 
(DSS).  But, the amount they pay is capped and was not increased when the minimum was 
introduced.4 Homes whose residents are paid for by the DSS are then in a situation where 
they are not able to pass any of their cost increases on to prices: this is likely to increase the 
scope for identifying employment effects from minimum wage introduction.   
                                                          
3 This logic is, of course, similar in spirit to Castillo-Freeman and Freeman’s (1991) study of Puerto Rico. 
Focusing on situations where more low paid workers are present obviously heightens the chance of finding 
employment effects of minimum wages. 
4 One may worry that other regulatory changes occurred at the same time as the introduction of the minimum 
wage. We were not able to find any such changes so ensuring our before and after analysis of wage and 
employment effects associated with minimum wage introduction are not contaminated by other coincident 
policy changes. 
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There is, of course, one disadvantage to looking at a sector in which minimum wages 
really ‘bite’, namely that one is more likely to find negative effects of minimum wages on 
employment. While labour economists have debated the relative merits of perfect competition 
or monopsony as models to explain the negative, positive or non-existent effects of minimum 
wages on employment (see, for example, Brown, 1999, for a recent review of this), all 
models of the labour market predict that a high enough minimum wage will reduce 
employment. So, one must be careful not to extrapolate from studies of one sector (especially 
the kind of sector we study) to conclusions about the economy as a whole. 
 We consider what happened to wages and employment in the care homes sector in the 
period surrounding the introduction of the NMW. The analysis confirms that the choice of 
sector is a good one for studying the likely impact of minimum wages.  Pay is very low, with 
the average hourly wage being around £4 just before the minimum wage introduction.  
Before its introduction around 1 in 3 workers were paid less than the minimum wage.  In 
April 1999 we see a spike in the wage distribution of around 30 percent at the minimum 
wage. The minimum wage clearly ‘bit hard’ in this sector.  It therefore provides a very good 
environment for looking at the impact of the minimum wage on employment. 
 We look at the employment effects of the minimum wage by considering what is now 
a standard technique in the empirical literature on minimum wages and employment. This 
relates changes in employment before and after the minimum wage introduction to the 
fraction of low paid workers in the pre-minimum wage period (see, for example, Card’s, 
1992, state based study of an increase in the US federal minimum wage in the early 1990s).  
In summary we find a sizable wage impact, together with moderate employment and hours 
reductions following the introduction of the minimum wage.  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II presents a brief history of 
minimum wage legislation in the UK and some summary statistics on employment over time 
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in the sector upon which we focus. Section III describes our data collection process and 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section IV reports empirical findings on the wage effects 
of the minimum wage. Section V then moves on to consider the employment and hours 
effects, together with a brief investigation of other possible outcomes.  Section VI then 
concludes. 
 
II. Minimum Wages in the UK and the Care Homes Sector 
Minimum Wages in the UK 
Unlike many other countries, minimum wages have historically not had a very important role 
to play in the UK labour market.  This is certainly true at the national level where there has 
never been an economy wide minimum wage floor. But minimum wages used to be a factor 
in some low wage sectors. There used to be an industry-based system of minimum wage 
floors, the Wages Councils, which operated from 1909 to their abolition in 1993. These 
Wages Councils covered around 12 percent of the workforce at the time of their abolition. In 
some earlier work we have studied the impact of the Wages Councils, concluding that their 
activities did little to harm employment, but that they compressed the wage structures of the 
sectors in which they operated  (Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999; Dolado et al, 1996). 
 Following its election in 1997, Tony Blair’s Labour Government was committed to 
introducing a National Minimum Wage (as the Labour Party had been in earlier elections that 
they lost). It set up a Low Pay Commission consisting of academics and representatives of 
employers and workers to report on a suitable form and level (see Low Pay Commission, 
1998). Eventually, a minimum wage of £3.60 per hour was introduced in April 1999 for those 
aged 22 or older, with a lower youth rate of £3 per hour for those aged 18-21 inclusive (those 
aged less than 18 were not covered).  The Low Pay Commission expected that around 9 
percent of workers would be directly affected and those workers would, on average, receive a 
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30 percent boost to their pay (Metcalf, 1999). These numbers have subsequently been revised 
down, with it seeming more likely that about 6 percent of workers’ wages were raised up to 
the minimum (Dickens and Manning, 2002). This, of course, still amounts to a potentially 
large impact on the labour market. 
Moreover, it is also clear that there is systematic variation in who benefited from 
minimum wage introduction. Metcalf (1999) also notes the increased importance of the 
minimum wage for part-time female workers. Of the workers he estimates to be directly 
affected by the introduction of the minimum wage, around 55 percent were women working 
part-time. The sector upon which we focus, the care homes sector, and particularly its 
principal occupation, that of care assistant, is very female intensive and has many part-time 
workers. Furthermore, as we will see when we describe our data more fully below, the 
majority of workers in this sector possess few formal qualifications and wages are very low. 
As such this is very much a sector that had the potential to be hit hard by the minimum wage. 
The Labour Market for Care Assistants 
 The occupation of care assistant is not only one of the lowest paid occupations5 but 
also is an increasingly important one in the UK. Indeed, not surprisingly given the aging of 
the population, the employment of care assistants has risen in recent years in the UK. One can 
gain some idea about the aggregate picture from looking at the number of care assistants in 
the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). Figure I shows total employment of care assistants 
in the private sector between 1994 and 2001.6 The vertical line on the Figure refers to the 
date of minimum wage introduction. 
 The Figure shows a rise in the number of private sector care assistants from around 
220000 in 1994 to 330000 by 2001. But closer scrutiny of the Figure shows that, according to 
                                                          
5 Taking a look at the occupational breakdowns in the published New Earnings Survey Tables each year 
normally finds the lowest paid occupation in the UK to be either hairdressers or care assistants. 
 9 
these aggregate numbers, there appears to be a moderate slowing down of employment 
growth in the later time period after minimum wage introduction. Of course, this can only be 
suggestive as business cycle factors may be at play here. However, looking at the temporal 
pattern of residuals from a regression of care assistant employment on the aggregate 
unemployment rate (or on GDP) still reveals the slower increases occurring post-minimum 
wage introduction (especially into the year 2000).7  
 This is illustrative of general employment trends for care assistants.8 However, to 
properly consider the question of employment effects of minimum wage introduction in a 
more systematic and rigorous fashion one really requires micro-data on a big enough sample 
of care assistants before and after minimum wage introduction. This is therefore what we turn 
to next. 
 
III. Data Issues and Descriptive Statistics    
Most existing UK data sources are really not well suited to carrying out a detailed before and 
after evaluation of the economic impact of the introduction of the UK minimum wage.9 We 
therefore decided to collect our own data. We wanted to focus on a situation where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Each point on Figure corresponds to the mid-month of each LFS quarter (which respectively cover the months 
March-May, June-August, September-November, December-February). 
7 Separate regressions of the log of the number care assistants on log(unemployment rate) and log(gdp) 
produced coefficients (standard errors) of -.68 (.04) and 1.18 (.07). Both regressions had an R-squared of .91. 
8 It also squares up with the demand side in that the size of the older age population was trending upwards as 
well. For example, the number of people aged 75 and over in the UK rose steadily year on year from 1996 
onwards as follows: 1996 – 4.17 million; 1997 – 4.24 million; 1998 – 4.29 million; 1999 – 4.33 million; 2000 – 
4.36 million (Source: Office for National Statistics).  
9 For example the survey containing the best wage data, and which covers the largest sample of workers, is the 
New Earnings Survey (NES). This has several serious shortcomings if one wished to try and evaluate the impact 
of minimum wage introduction. First, it is carried out in April of each year which is unfortunate as the minimum 
wage was introduced in April 1999. Wages contained in the survey are therefore a mish mash of pre- and post-
introduction wages. Second, and even more important, it undersamples low wage part-time workers (as workers 
below the National Insurance weekly earnings lower limit are not well picked up). The other commonly used 
micro-data suffer from other problems. First most (like the General Household Survey or the Family 
Expenditure Survey) simply do not contain enough low wage workers. Second as they are employee, rather than 
employer, surveys they are likely to be characterised by measurement errors in wages (see Dickens and 
Manning’s, 2002, analysis of Labour Force Survey data).  
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minimum wage had the potential to have an important impact and so chose to collect data on 
employers and workers in residential care homes. 
 As already noted, there are several compelling reasons for choosing this sector. First, 
it is a leading employer of many low wage workers. As already noted, the principal 
occupation, care assistants, is one of the lowest paid occupations in the UK. Second, most 
homes are reasonably small (average employment size < 20; median employment size = 15) 
and this enables us to collect data on all workers within the homes. Third, there are basically 
no trade unions to distort wage-setting procedures in this sector.   
Sample Design  
Our sample design was to sample the population of UK care homes before and after 
the introduction of the minimum wage.  We obtained lists of all homes from the Yellow 
Pages Business Database in July 1998 (for the pre-minimum sampling) and in May 1999 (for 
the post-minimum sampling).  There were 11635 care homes in the former and 11036 homes 
in the latter.  As one of the things one might be interested in is the extent to which employers 
adjusted wages before the minimum wage introduction we sampled (based on area 
stratification) one-ninth of the homes in each of the nine months before minimum wage 
introduction, and then we re-sampled the homes (including new homes), again one-ninth at a 
time, in the nine months following the introduction of the wage floor. We also identified 
home closures that occurred over this time period. 
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 The questionnaire was mailed to the manager of the care homes and asked a range of 
questions about the home and about the views managers (who are often home owners) had 
about the minimum wage. For obvious reasons, the precise nature of the attitudinal questions 
was different for questionnaires sent out before and after the introduction of the minimum 
wage.10  Managers were also asked to provide data on job title, sex, age, length of service, 
possession of a nursing qualification, weekly hours and hourly wages for all workers.   
For a postal survey we achieved a reasonable response rate (of the order of around 20 
percent). One may however worry about the representativeness of the achieved sample.  The 
Appendix therefore compares the sample we analyse with data on care assistants from the 
Labour Force Survey. The correspondence is reassuringly very close, giving a lot of 
confidence that the responses we received are representative, at least in terms of the variables 
we compare (age, hours, tenure and wages). One should also note that in a small number of 
homes managers were less likely to complete all the information on worker characteristics. In 
these cases where there was missing information on hourly wages and/or hours we imputed 
them using the average for that job within that firm. We report both results including and 
excluding imputed figures below. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Some features of the sample are described in Table 1.  The first two columns show the 
characteristics of the total sample of workers and homes pre and post minimum wage 
introduction, the middle two for all homes that we obtained some responses on worker 
characteristics in both sampling periods (the balanced panel of homes) and the final two 
columns further exclude homes where worker information supplied was very patchy.11   
                                                          
10 The actual questionnaires are available on request from the authors. 
11 More specifically we exclude homes where less than half of the workers have missing hours or wage 
information. 
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 The Table reveals a number of pertinent features of the labour market under study. 
First, and probably most striking, wages really are very low in the care homes sector.  Before 
the introduction of the minimum wage average wages were about £4 per hour (whether or not 
we include imputed wages does not make much difference). This sector therefore clearly 
satisfies one of the criteria we wanted to emphasise in a study of the impact of minimum 
wage introduction, namely that the imposition of the minimum wage floor had the potential 
to affect a large number of workers.  
The second clear feature of the wages data is that they rose sharply after minimum 
wage introduction. Average wages went up by somewhere around 24 pence per hour (or by 
around 6 percent). We consider this in much more detail in the next Section where we discuss 
the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage introduction. Of course, the requirement that the minimum 
wage introduction significantly affected wages and their distribution is a pre-requisite for 
going on to look at employment effects. 
 The Table also documents other characteristics of the sample. Average home size is 
fairly small, both in terms of workers and residents. Mean employment is in the range of 16 
to 17 workers, and the average number of residents is around 17 to 18 per home.  They both 
remain fairly constant before and after the minimum wage introduction. 
 As stated earlier the principal occupation in this sector is care assistants. This 
occupational group comprises over 60 percent of the workers in the sample. The workers are 
typically older workers (average age about 40), overwhelmingly female, working an average 
of 25 hours per week. Only around 1 in 10 possess a nursing qualification (other educational 
qualifications are not relevant in this sector).   
 Finally, we have collected other home level information on the occupancy rate of beds 
and, since the sector has price regulation operating through local authorities, on the percent of 
residents who pay local authority prices for beds. This latter feature of the sector is, of course, 
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very interesting in the context of minimum wage effects. One argument sometimes put 
forward in the literature is that one may not observe employment responses to minimum 
wages if employers are able to pass minimum wage increases on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices. This seems unlikely to happen in the care homes sector as prices are, in many 
cases, regulated by local authorities. We return to look at possible price responses later, after 
considering the wage and employment effects of the minimum wage introduction. 
    
IV. Wages and the Minimum Wage 
Before considering the employment consequences of minimum wage introduction, one 
clearly needs to establish that the minimum wage had the effect one expects on wages and the 
distribution of wages. As noted above, confirming that the minimum wage introduction had 
real ‘bite’ and affected the wages of low wage workers in the expected direction is clearly a 
prerequisite before one goes on to look at the impact on employment. 
The ‘Bite’ of The Minimum Wage Introduction  
The UK National Minimum Wage was introduced in April 1999 at £3.60 per hour for 
workers aged 22 or more, and at £3.00 per hour for 18-21 year olds. When presenting 
measures of the impact of the minimum wage we sometimes use these age-specific minimum 
wages and sometimes just the adult minimum: the reason for this is that there is a spike in the 
youth wage distribution at the adult minimum after the introduction so that one could argue 
that the adult minimum is the effective minimum.12  
Table 2 reports on our investigations of the impact of minimum wage introduction on 
wages. The numbers in the Table demonstrate a clear importance of minimum wage 
introduction for care home workers. The Table shows the percentage of workers paid less 
than the minimum wage prior to its introduction, how far wages would have to be increased if 
                                                          
12 See Katz and Krueger (1992) for evidence that in the US the youth sub-minimum is rarely used.  
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these workers’ wages were raised to the minimum and the percentage paid at exactly the 
minimum (the size of the minimum wage spike in the wage distribution). As with Table 1 
statistics are reported for all care homes, for the balanced panel and then for the balanced 
panel that excludes homes with limited worker information. 
The first thing to notice in the Table is that the sector we are studying is one that, 
conditional on the minimum wage introduction being binding, had the potential to be very 
heavily affected by the national minimum wage. Around 32 percent of workers were paid 
below the (age-specific) minimum wage before it was introduced. Around 38 percent were 
paid below the adult minimum rate. 
Table 2 also presents measures of the ‘wage gap’, namely the average increase in 
wages needed to bring workers beneath the mandated minimum up to the minimum.  The 
wage gap in firm i is computed as 
∑
∑ −
=
j
jiji
j
ji
min
jiji
i Wh
)0,Wmax(Wh
GAP where hji is the weekly 
hours worked by worker j in firm i, Wji is the hourly wage of worker j in firm i, and Wjimin is 
the minimum wage relevant for worker j in firm i (this might be the age-specific or the adult 
minimum). Table 2 shows that the wage gap averages 4 percent using the age-specific 
minimum and 4.7 percent using the adult minimum. Again this confirms a potentially very 
large impact of the minimum wage introduction on the sector. 
That the minimum wage impacted hard on the wage structure of care homes is borne 
out by looking at the post-minimum columns of the Table. First, there seems to be very little 
under-payment (around 1 percent for all homes or slightly lower in the balanced panels).  
However, something one might be concerned about here is that firms that subsequently pay 
illegally below the minimum wage do not respond to our survey. But were this to be true we 
would expect to see the initial wage levels in our sample as a whole being below those in the 
balanced panel as the latter homes respond to the survey both before and after the minimum 
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wage was introduced. However, Table 1 shows initial pre-minimum wage introduction wages 
to actually be slightly higher in the full sample as compared to the balanced panel, so there is 
no evidence that this is the case.13  
The second feature of Table 2 that shows the minimum wage ‘bit’ hard is the very 
noticeable spike at the minimum after April 1999.  Something like 28 or 29 percent of 
workers were paid the age-specific minimum after introduction and around 30 to 31 percent 
were paid the adult minimum. One should notice here that the spike is measured at exactly 
the minimum wage (not as plus or minus a small range around the minimum as in some other 
studies). 
Not surprisingly the minimum wage introduction therefore had a sizable impact on 
wage dispersion. The gap between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the log(hourly wage) 
distribution narrowed from .21 to .09. At the same time the upper half of the distribution was 
unaffected with the gap between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the distribution not changing. 
The 90-50 gap was .34 in both pre- and post-minimum time periods.14   
Minimum Wage Introduction and Care Home Wages 
The numbers in Table 2 show a strong impact of minimum wage introduction on the 
care homes wage distribution. But, for our empirical analysis, we would also like evidence 
that the homes we would most expect to be affected were, indeed, the most affected.  This is 
the purpose of this sub-section.  More specifically the basic wage change equations we 
estimate are of the form: 
∆lnWit  = α1+ β1MINi,t-1 + δ1Xi,t-1 + εit    (1) 
where ∆lnWit is the change in wages for home i in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction (t-1 denotes the period before, t the post-minimum period), MINi, t-1 is a measure 
                                                          
13 We also investigated whether the sample response rates fell disproportionately in the low-wage regions where 
the minimum wage had more bite.  There was no evidence of this either. 
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of the importance of the minimum wage for home i (defined below), Xi,t-1 is the (t-1) level 
home and worker characteristics15 and εit is an error term. The key parameter of interest is β1 
which measures the relation between wage changes and the minimum holding constant the 
other factors we control for. 
 There are some practical concerns with this kind of equation. The first issue is how 
one measures MINi, t-1. We use the two measures of the impact of the minimum wage already 
discussed in Table 2: the proportion of workers paid less than the minimum wage in the 
period before its introduction, and the wage gap.  It is not clear which is the better measure. 
For example, if the minimum wage caused all workers initially paid below it to lose their 
jobs, then the headcount might be the better measure, but if it is more difficult to raise the 
productivity of those a long way below the minimum wage than those near it, then the wage 
gap measure might be better. 
 The second main modeling issue concerns identification. Because the minimum wage 
introduction in the UK was at national level the variation across homes in the impact of the 
minimum wage all comes from variation in the initial level of wages. β1 is then only a true 
measure of the impact of the minimum wage if, in the absence of the minimum wage, there 
would be no relationship between the initial level of wages and the change in wages (i.e. if 
wages follow a random walk). This is the implicit identification assumption in using an 
equation like (1) to estimate the impact of the minimum wage.  
We test this identifying assumption in two related ways that consider whether the 
relationship between wage changes and their initial level shifted in the period surrounding 
minimum wage introduction relative to an earlier period when no minimum wage was in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14 See Dickens and Manning (2002) for an in-depth analysis of the impact of minimum wage introduction on 
wage inequality in the UK. 
15 We also considered models where, rather than entering the initial period home and worker characteristics as 
controls,  the change in X, ∆Xit, was entered. This made very little difference to the reported pattern of results 
throughout our analysis. 
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place. We first look at the relationship between wage changes and initial wages in the 
minimum wage introduction period (1998/99) as compared to the relationship estimated from 
some data we collected in an earlier time period (1992/93) for care homes on the south coast 
of England.16 Second we consider whether the relationship between wage changes and the 
minimum wage variable altered across these two time periods by constructing a counter-
factual minimum wage variable (placing the minimum at the same percentile point of the 
initial wage distribution17) in the earlier non-minimum wage time period.  We do this for both 
the headcount and wage gap measures. The two approaches thereby enable us to consider 
whether one observes a different association in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction as compared to an earlier time period where no such policy was in place. 
Estimates of Wage Change Equations 
Table 3 reports estimates of home-level wage change equations for hourly wages 
(upper panel) and for weekly wages (lower panel) in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction. Four specifications are reported in each case. Rows (1) and (2) present estimates 
of wage equations including the initial low pay proportion to measure MINi, t-1. They differ in 
that the first specification excludes and the second specification includes a set of control 
variables. Rows (3) and (4) then present analogous specifications using the wage gap measure 
as an independent variable.  
In all cases there is evidence of bigger wage increases in homes with more low-wage 
workers in the pre-minimum wage period. The associations are strong in statistical terms and 
are sizable. They also look rather similar for hourly and weekly wages. For example, 
                                                          
16  See Machin, Manning and Woodland (1993) for more detail on this earlier survey and Machin and Manning 
(2002) for an analysis of wage structure in care homes in the earlier time period. This 1992/93 survey was 
carried out for the same reason as the current one, namely to evaluate the impact of minimum wage introduction 
on care homes.  The first wave of the survey was carried out before the April 1992 election as the Labour Party 
manifesto had committed to introduce a minimum wage if they were elected.  Their loss of the election meant 
our plan to carry out a before and after analysis of minimum wage introduction was scuppered. We still, 
however, collected data after the election period and so can look at before and after changes with these data as 
well. 
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according to row (2) of the upper panel of Table 3 a home with one third of its workers paid 
less than the minimum saw average wage growth of 3.3 percent higher than one which had 
one tenth of its workers paid less than the minimum.18 This is large given that average wage 
growth was around 6 percent in this time period 
 These results appear to establish an important impact on wages of the minimum wage 
but, as noted above, it may merely be because there has always been a link between wage 
growth and initial low pay. So we investigate this in some detail in Table 4. We do so in the 
two main ways already mentioned above. First, we estimate equations relating wage change 
to the initial period average wage in the periods surrounding minimum wage introduction and 
in the earlier 1992/93 time period for which we have data where no minimum wage was in 
place. This equation takes the form: 
 ∆lnWit  = α2 + β2lnWi,t-1 + υit     (2) 
where the focus is now on estimating the association between wage changes and the initial 
average wage, namely the parameter β2  (υ is an error term). 
 The second way in which we benchmark our results against the earlier time period is 
to return to equation (1) and specify a counter-factual minimum wage in the earlier non-
minimum wage period so as to compute measures of the initial low pay proportion and wage 
gap variables. We do so by placing this counter-factual minimum at the same percentile point 
of the wage distribution. 
 Table 4 reports these results for hourly wages. For all three specifications there is a 
clear shift in the relationship between wage changes and the initial wage measures in the 
period surrounding minimum wage introduction as compared to the earlier time period. The 
significantly negative coefficient on the initial wage in the 1998/99 model in row (1) of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17  This corresponds to £2.75 per hour. 
18  The calculation is .145*(.33 - .10) = .033. 
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Table demonstrates very clearly that, in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction, 
wage growth was higher in firms with lower wages in the initial period.  In the earlier non-
minimum wage period (1992/93) there is also a negative coefficient on the initial wage, but it 
is clear that its magnitude is much smaller (in absolute terms) than in 1998/99.  The final 
column reports the gap between the two and it is very clear that the relationship shifted 
markedly between the two time periods. 
 Some graphs also serve to make the same point.  Figure 2a plots the relationship 
between average wage growth and the initial log wage in 1998/99 and Figure 2b does the 
same for the 1992/93 data.  While it is very clear that there is a negative relationship in both 
periods, the strong diagonal effect on homes with initial low wages is very apparent in the 
1998/99 data.  This reveals a clear impact of the minimum wage. 
 In rows (2) and (3) of Table 4 we also report results of wage growth equations 
including the initial minimum wage variables for the 1998/99 data and the counter-factual 
initial minimum wage variables for the 1992/93 data. These very much reconfirm the pattern 
from the row (1) models. There is a marked shift between periods for both measures as one 
can see a much stronger positive impact of the initial minimum wage variables in the period 
surrounding minimum wage introduction. Indeed, there is no relationship between wage 
changes and the initial low pay proportion in the earlier non-minimum wage period and a 
much smaller association with the initial wage gap measure. This shift is borne out by the 
positive, statistically significant gaps given in the final column of the Table. 
All in all, the evidence of this Section has established a clear and important effect of 
minimum wage introduction on care home wages. We turn to investigate the possible 
employment effects in the next section. 
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V. Employment and the Minimum Wage 
We analyse the employment consequences of the minimum wage introduction using 
the same kind of methodology as the wage analysis. We estimate home-level equations that 
relate changes in employment or hours in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction 
to headcount and wage measures of the extent of initial low pay. And, because of the 
identification questions already raised, we look at the relationship between changes in 
employment and initial wage levels in the period of minimum wage introduction and the 
period where no minimum wage was in place. We begin with the latter in the next sub-
section, and then move on to the former after that. 
Changes in Employment and Initial Wages 
As before, the implicit identification assumption here is that, in the absence of the 
minimum wage, there would be no relationship between employment growth and the initial 
level of wages.  It is not obvious this is the case (e.g. homes that are doing less well might 
pay lower wages and have lower employment growth) so we start by investigating the 
relationship between employment growth and initial wages. 
Table 5 reports the results of carrying out this exercise for the period surrounding 
minimum wage introduction (1998/99) and for the earlier period (1992/93) where no such 
policy intervention occurred. The upper panel of the Table reports models where changes in 
log total employment are related to the initial period wage measures, whilst the lower panel 
reports results where the dependent variable is the change in log total hours. 
 The first thing to note is that the correlations of employment changes with initial wage 
measures tend to be weaker than the correlations with wage changes considered earlier. That 
said, there is some evidence (of varying strength depending on specification) of shifts 
occurring between the ‘policy on’ and ‘policy off’ time periods. In all cases but one, the sign 
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of the relationship switches between periods, revealing a tilt in the relationship so that, in the 
period surrounding minimum wage introduction, employment growth tended to be reduced in 
homes that were impacted more by minimum wage introduction. And some of the gaps in the 
final column are statistically significant (or on the borders of significance, the one exception 
being the initial period low proportion in the upper panel of the Table). We take this as some 
preliminary evidence that the relationship between employment and low wages may have 
shifted in the period surrounding minimum wages. 
Changes in Employment And Initial Minimum Wage Variables 
In this sub-section we consider in more detail the relationship between home-level 
employment and hours changes and the minimum wage variables in the period surrounding 
minimum wage introduction. Figures 3 and 4 plot the basic data we use to look at these. The 
change in log total employment is plotted against the initial proportion low-paid in Figure 3a 
and against the initial wage-gap in 3b.  Figures 4a and 4b do the same but with the change in 
log total hours on the left-hand axis.  Eyeballing these scatterplots does not reveal any distinct 
pattern, despite the very clear wage evidence presented earlier. 
In the first instance we estimate reduced form employment change equations of the 
form: 
 ∆lnNit  = α3 + β3 MINi,t-1 + δ3Xi,t-1 + ζit    (3) 
Various estimates of equation (3) are given in columns (1) through (6) of Table 6, for 
changes in total employment in the upper panel and for changes in total hours in the lower 
panel of the Table. In the final two columns of the Table we also present structural estimates 
of labour demand equations from a simple structural model of the following form (equation 
(1) is reproduced from above): 
 ∆lnNit  = α4 + β4 ∆lnWit  + δ4Xi,t-1 + ωit    (4) 
∆lnWit  = α1+ β1MINi,t-1 + δ1Xi,t-1 + εit    (1) 
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We are able to estimate β4, the wage elasticity of labour demand, by using MINi,t-1 as an 
instrumental variable for the wage change (equation (1) can thus be thought of as the first 
stage regression in the IV procedure). It is also straightforward to see how this relates to the 
reduced form models (1) and (3) where the labour demand elasticity β4 is given by β3/β1. 
 Turning to the results in the Table, columns (1) and (4) report the coefficient on the 
initial low pay proportion and the initial wage gap respectively in a regression where the 
dependent variable is the change in log employment or log hours and there are no other 
controls. In these basic models the estimated impact of the minimum wage is negative, 
though not significantly different from zero. However the addition of controls and restriction 
of the sample to those with relatively complete information on worker characteristics 
(columns (2) and (3) for the headcount, columns (5) and (6) for the wage gap) makes the 
coefficients both larger in absolute terms and more significant.  In these specifications we are 
able to pin down a significant negative effect on employment growth.   
The Table also reports implicit elasticities calculated on the basis of a minimum wage 
increase of 40p (the adult rate going from £3.60 to £4.00).  These ask the question: what 
would the additional effect on employment have been if the minimum wage had been 
introduced at a higher level? In the models with controls these elasticities are in the range of 
–.15 to –.40. These are reasonably sizable in the context of the minimum wage literature, 
though are not so big given the very large impact of minimum wage introduction on the 
wages and wage distribution of care home workers.   
The other, related, way to look at the employment response to wage changes is to 
directly compute the elasticity of employment with respect to the wage, using the initial wage 
gap variable as an instrument for the change in average wages. Structural estimates of 
employment change equations are reported in columns (7) and (8). They reveal a well 
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determined negative wage effect that is moderate in size19, ranging from about -.35 to -.55, 
depending on the specification.  
One issue of possible importance is the speed at which employers may adjust in 
response to minimum wages. It is hard to do anything very convincing here given we only 
follow homes nine months before and after minimum wage introduction. But, from what we 
can look at, it seems that wage adjustment was very rapid and the wages clearly adjusted at 
the time of introduction and barely at all before (i.e. there seems no evidence of ‘anticipation’ 
effects on wages). Employment adjustment may be slower, but one should note that this is a 
very high employee turnover sector (presumably in part due to the very low wages). 
Furthermore a study of what happened to wages and employment in care homes before and 
after the more recent uprating of the minimum wage (up to £4.10 for adults and £3.50 for 18-
21 year olds in October 2001) finds employment effects of much the same magnitude, and no 
stronger, than those reported here (Allison, 2002). 
 While the estimated employment effects are clearly not as strong as the wage effects 
considered in the previous section of the paper, they do suggest that employers cut 
employment and hours in response to the minimum wage.20 One might wonder how this is 
possible in this sector as these firms are regulated and there are minimum standards of care 
for the residents that are mandated. However, inspection of these homes is far from perfect 
and the sector is notorious for examples of homeowners providing inadequate standards of 
care (for example, they have been the subject of several TV documentaries). It seems 
                                                          
19  See Hamermesh (1993) for a very detailed consideration of the large body of work that estimates labour 
demand elasticities. 
20 The analysis is based upon the balanced panel of homes. Given our data we can also look at closures, 
although only in the window very recently after minimum wage introduction (since our second wave is based on 
a sample of homes in May 1999). Running probit models of closure on the two minimum wage variables, and 
either including or excluding the control variables, resulted in positive, but very small estimated marginal effects 
(all of which were statistically insignificant). Whilst it is clear that effects may differ if one looks at a longer 
period, this short run analysis finds no evidence that rising wage costs ensuing from minimum wage 
introduction resulted in home closure. The same conclusions were reached for a county-level analysis of entry 
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plausible that managers face a trade-off between the fraction of the time they are in breach of 
care guidelines (which is determined by employment) and the probability of being fined 
when inspected in that situation. In addition, owner-managers often work considerable hours 
in the homes themselves and may have the ability to substitute their labour for that of paid 
help. 
Other Outcomes and the Minimum Wage 
This section briefly investigates the impact of the minimum wage on other outcomes.  
It is possible that they may have ‘passed on’ increased wage costs from the minimum wage 
introduction through higher prices though the extent to which this is possible may be limited 
by the price regulation in place.  Second, there may have had to be re-organizations that could 
raise productivity (e.g. quality of care improvements, or increases in care worker 
productivity, or simply making people work harder for their higher wages). 
We consider these possibilities in Table 7. The upper panel reports price change 
equations and the lower two panels consider two productivity measures, using the same kind 
of models as for wages and employment. The first productivity measure used is changes in 
residents per worker hour, the second comes from managers’ responses to a question about 
whether they think worker effort went up, stayed the same, or fell in the period around 
minimum wage introduction. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the nature of price regulation in the care homes sector 
we find no evidence that prices rose by more in the initial low wage firms.  All the estimated 
coefficients in the upper panel are small and none of the coefficients approach anything near 
statistical significance (all have t-ratios < 1).  As such there seems to be no evidence that 
minimum wage increases might have been passed on through higher prices in this sector. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and closure using Labour Force Survey data. All of these results are presented in the earlier Discussion Paper 
version of this paper (Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2002). 
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There is also not much evidence in line with the re-organization/productivity 
improvement idea considered in the lower panels of Table 9. While the estimated coefficients 
on the minimum wage variables in both the change in residents per worker hour and 
subjective effort change equations are all estimated to be positive, none are significantly 
different from zero when the control variables are included.  
  
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented empirical work on the wage and employment consequences 
of the recent introduction of the UK national minimum wage for a specific sector of the UK 
labour market. As we argued in the introduction to the paper we think examination of the 
economic effects of this minimum wage introduction provides a good testing ground for 
looking at minimum wage effects and provides an ideal opportunity for presenting some fresh 
evidence on the debate about what minimum wages do. We implement our empirical study 
by focusing on workers in the care homes industry, a low wage sector that was highly 
vulnerable to minimum wage introduction. In the absence of suitable data from existing 
sources we chose to examine the minimum wage impact by carrying out our own survey 
before and after the minimum wage was introduced.  
From our analysis of these data we find there to have been a very important wage 
compression effect on the bottom half of the wage distribution in this low wage sector. 
Before its introduction around 1 in 3 care home workers were paid less than the minimum 
wage. In April 1999 we see a spike in the wage distribution of around 30 percent at exactly 
the minimum wage (and little evidence of non-compliance). This resulted in wage growth 
being considerably higher in the period surrounding minimum wage workers in homes who 
had more low-paid workers before the minimum came in.  This seems to establish that the 
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minimum wage had considerable ‘bite’ on wages and this substantially altered the structure 
of wages of this sector. 
Turning to the employment consequences, we are able to find some evidence of 
employment and hours reductions occurring in homes after minimum wage introduction. This 
seems to be in line with the aggregate behaviour of the labour market for care assistants, 
where the fast employment increases of the pre-minimum wage period slowed down in 1999 
and 2000.  
Of course, one should be very careful to note that the sector we have examined is 
particularly vulnerable to the minimum wage as it has very many low-paid workers. It is also 
rather special in that its product market structure means homes are constrained in their ability 
to pass higher wage costs on into higher prices. Given this, and the fact that studies of the 
impact of minimum wage introduction on the overall UK labour market uncover little 
evidence of job loss (Stewart, 2001), one should remain cautious in drawing conclusions 
from this study about the impact of the introduction of the National Minimum Wage on the 
UK as a whole. 
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Table 1:  
Survey Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 All Firms Balanced Panel Balanced Panel 
(Excluding firms with a 
lot of missing worker 
information) 
 Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Number of Homes 1866 2142 641 641 615 615 
Number of Workers 17.2 
(12.2) 
17.2 
(13.0) 
16.4 
(9.7) 
16.7 
(11.9) 
16.5 
(9.7) 
16.8 
(11.9) 
Hourly Wage 
(None imputed) 
4.03 
(0.85) 
4.27 
(0.80) 
4.00 
(0.80) 
4.24 
(0.72) 
3.98 
(0.74) 
4.23 
(0.71) 
Hourly Wage 
(With imputed) 
4.01 
(0.82) 
4.26 
(0.75) 
3.98 
(0.75) 
4.23 
(0.71) 
3.98 
(0.74) 
4.22 
(0.70) 
Weekly Hours  
(None imputed) 
25.6 
(6.5) 
25.2 
(6.1) 
24.9 
(6.3) 
25.0 
(5.8) 
24.7 
(5.9) 
24.8 
(5.7) 
Weekly Hours  
(With imputed) 
25.8 
(6.5) 
25.4 
(6.0) 
25.2 
(6.2) 
25.2 
(5.8) 
24.9 
(5.9) 
25.0 
(5.6) 
Weekly Earnings 
(None imputed) 
103.85 
(38.92) 
108.31 
(37.65 
100.41 
(37.84) 
106.47 
(34.33) 
99.00 
(33.79) 
105.59 
(33.97) 
Weekly Earnings 
(With imputed) 
104.14 
(37.11) 
108.76 
(35.96) 
100.61 
(34.55) 
107.11 
(33.86) 
99.70 
(33.61) 
106.23 
(33.65) 
Proportion of 
workers with missing 
information 
0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Proportion Female 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Average Age 40.1 
(6.6) 
40.7 
(6.9) 
40.3 
(6.3) 
40.5 
(6.5) 
40.3 
(6.2) 
40.5 
(6.5) 
Proportion Care 
Assistants 
0.63 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.64 
Proportion With 
Nursing 
Qualification 
0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Number of Beds 20.7 
(36.6) 
19.7 
(16.3) 
18.5 
(18.5) 
19.0 
(19.8) 
18.6 
(18.8) 
19.1 
(20.2) 
Number of Residents 18.5 
(35.7) 
17.8 
(15.0) 
16.5 
(17.7) 
17.0 
(18.8) 
16.6 
(18.0) 
17.1 
(19.1) 
Occupancy Rate 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 
Average Weekly 
Price per Bed (£) 
252.4 
(86.1) 
258.2 
(92.3) 
250.1 
(78.3) 
257.4 
(79.3) 
249.6 
(78.3) 
256.9 
(78.9) 
Proportion 
DSS/Local Authority 
0.55 0.58 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.57 
 
Notes: 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Pre-Minimum observations refer to responses received before April 1999 
and Post-Minimum to responses received after March 1999. Care Assistants include senior, day and junior 
carers but exclude night carers and sleep-ins. The final two columns exclude homes where less than half of the 
workers have missing hours or wage information. 
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Table 2: The “Bite” of the Minimum Wage Introduction  
 
 
 All Firms Balanced Panel Balanced Panel 
(Excluding firms with a lot 
of missing worker 
information) 
 Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
% Paid Less 
Than 
Minimum 
Wage 
32.3 1.0 31.2 0.8 31.6 0.7 
% Paid Less 
Than Adult 
Minimum 
Wage 
38.2 4.2 37.7 4.3 38.2 4.3 
Wage Gap 0.039 0.002 0.041 0.003 0.039 0.002 
Adult Wage 
Gap 
0.047 0.006 0.049 0.007 0.047 0.007 
% Paid 
Exactly 
Minimum 
Wage  
8.7 27.7 9.3 28.4 9.5 28.7 
% Paid 
Exactly Adult 
Minimum 
Wage 
8.6 30.0 9.0 30.6 9.3 31.0 
Number of 
Homes 
1866 2142 641 641 615 615 
 
Notes: 
Pre-Minimum observations refer to responses received before April 1999 and Post-Minimum to responses 
received after March 1999. The final two columns exclude homes where less than half of the workers have 
missing hours or wage information. 
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Table 3: Changes in Log Wages And Initial Period Wage Measures in the Period 
Surrounding Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
 
 
Change in Log Average Hourly Wage 
 Time Period Initial Low 
Pay 
Proportion 
Initial 
Wage 
Gap 
Initial 
Log 
Wage 
Controls R2 Number 
of Homes 
(1) 1998/99 .145 
(.012) 
  No .19 641 
(2) 1998/99 .149 
(.021) 
  Yes .30 598 
(3) 1998/99  
 
.800 
(.070) 
 No .36 641 
(4) 1998/99  
 
.815 
(.086) 
 Yes .45 598 
Change in Log Average Weekly Wage 
 Time Period Initial Low 
Pay 
Proportion 
Initial 
Wage 
Gap 
Initial 
Log 
Wage 
Controls R2 Number 
of Homes 
(1) 1998/99 .136 
(.025) 
  No .04 641 
(2) 1998/99 .141 
(.035) 
  Yes .19 598 
(3) 1998/99  
 
.664 
(.118) 
 No .06 641 
(4) 1998/99  
 
.693 
(.159) 
 Yes .21 598 
 
 
Notes: Sample is balanced panel of homes. Standard errors in parentheses. Control variable are the initial 
proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants and average age (all 
workers), occupancy rate, proportion of local authority/dss residents, county and response month dummies. 
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Table 4: Changes in Log Wages And Initial Period Wage Measures in the Period 
Surrounding Minimum Wage Introduction Compared to an Earlier Period (When no 
Minimum Wage was in Place) 
 
 
Change in Log Average Hourly Wage 
  1998/99: Period 
Surrounding 
Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
1992/93: Earlier Time 
Period Where no 
Minimum Wage was 
in Place 
Difference 
 (Standard Error) 
(1) Initial period log wage 
-.360 (.040) -.174 (.057) -.186 (.070) 
(2) 
Initial period low 
pay proportion 
(counterfactual in 
1992/93) 
.147 (.013) .019 (.013) .126 (.026) 
(3) 
Initial period wage 
gap (counterfactual 
in 1992/93) 
.800 (.070) .225 (.102) .575 (.124) 
 
Notes: Based on 641 homes in 1998/99 and 231 homes in 1992/93. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Changes in Log Employment and Hours  
And Initial Period Wage Measures in the Period Surrounding Minimum Wage 
Introduction Compared to an Earlier Period (When no Minimum Wage was in Place) 
 
 
 
 
 Change in Log Number Employed 
 
 1998/99: Period 
Surrounding 
Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
1992/93: Earlier Time 
Period Where no 
Minimum Wage was 
in Place 
Difference 
(Standard Error) 
(1) Initial period log wage 
.108 (.082) -.190 (.147) .299 (.168) 
(2) 
Initial period low 
pay proportion 
(counterfactual in 
1992/93) 
-.059 (.042) -.022 (.044) -.037 (.061) 
(3) 
Initial period wage 
gap (counterfactual 
in 1992/93) 
-.173 (.108) .053 (.137) -.226 (.174) 
 Change in Log Total Hours 
 
 1998/99: Period 
Surrounding 
Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
1992/93: Earlier Time 
Period Where no 
Minimum Wage was 
in Place 
Gap 
 (Standard Error) 
(1) Initial period log wage 
.153 (.093) -.220 (.165) .375 (.189) 
(2) 
Initial period low 
pay proportion 
(counterfactual in 
1992/93) 
-.069 (.046) .028 (.053) -.097 (.069) 
(3) 
Initial period wage 
gap (counterfactual 
in 1992/93) 
-.313 (.135) .365 (.180) -.678 (.224) 
 
Notes: Based on 641 homes in 1998/99 and 231 homes in 1992/93. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: Changes in Log Employment and Hours  
And Initial Period Minimum Wage Measures in the  
Period Surrounding Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
 Change in Log Number Employed 
 Reduced Form Models Structural Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Clean 
panel 
(4) (5) (6) 
Clean 
panel 
(7) 
IV 
estimates 
(8) 
Clean 
panel, IV 
estimates 
Initial Proportion Paid 
Less Than Minimum 
Wage 
-.059 
(.042) 
-.136 
(.056) 
-.165 
(.057) 
     
Initial Wage Gap    -.173 (.108) 
-.281 
(.141) 
-.552 
(.259) 
  
Change in Log Hourly 
Wage       
-.345 
(.159) 
-.561 
(.317) 
Demographic Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics 
Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Response Month 
Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average Elasticity:  
(4.00-3.60) -.14 -.31 -.38 -.08 -.14 -.27   
Observations 641 598 575 641 598 575 598 575 
R-squared .003 .155 .152 .001 .149 .143   
 Change in Log Total Hours 
 Reduced Form Models Structural Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Clean 
panel 
(4) (5) (6) 
Clean 
panel 
(7) 
IV 
estimates 
(8) 
Clean 
panel, IV 
estimates 
Initial Proportion Paid 
Less Than Minimum 
Wage 
-.069 
(.046) 
-.144 
(.066) 
-.170 
(.066) 
     
Initial Wage Gap    -.310 (.135) 
-.402 
(.145) 
-.509 
(.311) 
  
Change in Log Hourly 
Wage       
-.494 
(.289) 
-.518 
(.353) 
Demographic Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics 
Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Response Month 
Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average Elasticity  
(4.00-3.60) -.16 -.33 -.39 -.15 -.20 -.25   
Observations 641 598 575 641 598 575 598 575 
R-squared .003 .135 .148 .004 .132 .139   
 
Notes: Sample is balanced panel of homes. Standard errors in parentheses. Control variable are the initial 
proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants and average age (all 
workers), occupancy rate, proportion of local authority/dss residents, county and response month dummies. 
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Table 7: Prices, Productivity and the Minimum Wage 
 
 Change in Log Average Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum Wage -0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.027)   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.116 
(0.145) 
0.048 
(0.155) 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 
Number of Homes 572 501 572 501 
 Change in Log Residents Per Worker Hour 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum Wage 0.103 
(0.044) 
0.068 
(0.047)   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.334 
(0.275) 
0.111 
(0.273) 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.20 
Number of Homes 586 514 586 514 
 Subjective Responses on Change in Worker Effort 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum Wage 0.063 
(0.183) 
0.100 
(0.201)   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.530 
(1.085) 
0.922 
(1.166) 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Log-Likelihood -245.24 -210.91 -245.18 -210.72 
Number of Homes 561 486 561 486 
 
Notes: 
As for Table 6. Effort variable coded as an ordered response based on answers to the question “Has the 
minimum wage had an impact on work effort in your business? No/Yes – Decrease/Yes-Increase”.  It is ordered 
from 0 (decrease), 1 (no change), to 2 (increase).  Ordered  probit coefficients (and associated standard errors) 
reported for this variable. 
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Figure 1 
Numbers of Private Sector Care Assistants, 1994-2001 
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Notes: 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Each point corresponds to the mid-month of each LFS quarter. Vertical line 
corresponds to minimum wage introduction in April 1999. 
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Figure 2a 
The Relationship Between Wage Growth and Initial Wages: 1998/99 
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Figure 2b 
The Relationship Between Wage Growth and Initial Wages: 1992/93 
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Figure 3a 
The Relationship Between the Change in Log Total Employment and Initial Proportion 
Low-Paid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b 
The Relationship Between the Change in Log Total Employment and Initial Wage Gap 
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Figure 4a 
The Relationship between the Change in Log Total Hours and Initial Proportion Low-
Paid 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b 
The Relationship between the Change in Log Total Hours and Initial Wage Gap 
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Appendix: Representativeness of the Sample 
 
In this Appendix we compare the distributions of the responses to our survey with those from 
the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
 
From our survey we report results for care assistants.  For the LFS, we report results for 
private-sector workers in the ‘industry’ ‘social work with accommodation’ (class 85.31), 
whose occupation is ‘care assistants and attendants’.  The LFS sample comes from March 
1998 to February 2000 so approximately coincides with the period of our survey. 
 
In the Table below we report selected percentiles of the distribution of the characteristics of 
care assistants in our sample and in the LFS.  We have information on age, hours, job tenure 
and hourly wages.  For age, hours and job tenure there is no problem in comparing the 
variables in our sample and the LFS and the sample sizes are both large.  As can be seen from 
the Table, the distributions are remarkably similar. 
 
The comparison of the distribution of hourly wages is made more difficult by deficiencies in 
the LFS data that lead to small sample sizes.  First, wage information is only collected in 
waves 1 and 5 (out of 5) so is automatically missing for 60% of observations.  Secondly, the 
main LFS pay variable (which is derived by dividing weekly wages by weekly hours) is now 
recognized to have very large amount of measurement error and its use led to a wild over-
estimate of the numbers of workers who were affected by the minimum wage (see Dickens 
and Manning, 2002).  In March 1999 it was supplemented by a direct measure of the hourly 
wage for hourly-paid workers: this measure has less measurement error but is not observed 
for all workers (for our sample here it is 50%). 
 
As a result of this we only have 167 observations in the LFS on the good measure of the 
hourly wage.  The distribution of this variable is reported in the Table below in the row 
labelled LFS(1).  Its distribution is similar to that in our sample (we restrict ourselves here to 
the post-NMW period as this is the only period for which we have the LFS (1) measure).  
One other concern is that those who report an hourly rate in the LFS are not randomly 
selected.  A number of methods for dealing with this have been proposed (see Dickens and 
Manning, 2002, for a discussion).  Here we report the results using an inverse propensity 
score re-weighting in the row labelled LFS(2).  For our sample, probably because they are so 
homogeneous, the re-weighted distribution is very similar to the unweighted distribution. 
 
All of this evidence suggests that we do not have a problem with the representativeness of our 
sample. In fact the survey and LFS summary statistics square up exceptionally well. 
 
 Sample 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th Observations 
          
Age Ours 18 20 27 37 48 56 60 39316 
LFS 18 20 26 36 49 55 59 3218 
          
Weekly 
Hours 
Ours 9 12 18.5 26 35 39 40 39624 
LFS 10 14 20 30 36 40 42 3188 
          
Tenure 
(months) 
Ours 2 4 12 24 60 108 132 39905 
LFS 2 3 9 25 60 108 132 3205 
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Hourly 
Wage 
Ours 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.80 4.25 5.04 5.57 21313 
LFS(1) 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.77 4.20 4.75 5.00 167 
LFS(2) 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.77 4.15 4.70 5.00 166 
 
 
